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Rearming Felons: Federal Jurisdiction
under 18 USC § 925(c)
Ryan Laurence Nelsont

Two men have been convicted of felonies. Both have served a
prison term of more than one year; both have identical backgrounds and criminal histories; both are sorry and have repented.
However, one man lives in Pennsylvania, the other lives in Colorado. Currently federal law prohibits both men from possessing a
firearm because of their respective criminal convictions and sentences.'
Each man has filed a petition with the Secretary of the
Treasury ("Secretary") requesting reinstatement of his federal
firearms privileges, and each has given the same reasons for requesting relief. However, only the Pennsylvania felon will have
an opportunity to once again legally carry a firearm. Why will
only the Pennsylvania felon have an opportunity to have his firearms privileges reinstated?
The answer can be found in the text and interpretation of 18
USC § 925(c), a statute that permits the Secretary to reinstate a
felons' firearms privileges, and also permits federal courts to review applications that the Secretary denies.2 In 1993, despite
years of providing financial support, Congress removed funding
from the Secretary, specifically the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms ("ATF"), to review § 925(c) petitions, and the cirt B.S., B.A. 1999, Southern Methodist University; J.D. Candidate 2002, University
of Chicago.
1 See 18 USC § 922(g) (2000) (making it unlawful for anyone convicted of a crime
punishable by more than one year in prison "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce").
2 See 18 USC § 925(c) (2000):
A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition may make application to the Secretary
for relief ....
Any person whose application for relief from disabilities is
denied by the Secretary may file a petition with the United States district
court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such denial.

552

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2001:

cuits disagree over whether the courts can nevertheless exercise
jurisdiction over restatement requests.' Various federal courts
have assumed that they have jurisdiction over petitions to reinstate federal firearms privileges,4 while other courts have denied
jurisdiction over the same matters.' This Comment argues that
courts do not have jurisdiction to hear § 925(c) petitions filed by
individual felons where Congress has denied funding for review of
those petitions.
Part I of this Comment outlines relevant federal firearms
regulations as they have developed over time. Part II discusses
the core issues that have divided the circuit courts. Part III analyzes the text of § 925(c) and its legislative history. Part IV critiques the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies (the "exhaustion doctrine") before resorting to the courts and
why the courts cannot assume jurisdiction without proper initial
review by the ATF and determination by the Secretary. Part V
explores other policy considerations that cut against jurisdiction.

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELEVANT FIREARMS LEGISLATION
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution is
commonly cited as the constitutional provision that guarantees
the right of the people to keep and bear arms.' Within the limitations and rights of this amendment, Congress has developed a
substantial body of law, predominately in the 20th century, regulating firearms in the United States.7

3 Compare Rice v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,68 F3d 702, 710 (3d Cir
1995) (granting jurisdiction over 18 USC § 925(c) petitions), with Saccacio v Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,211 F3d 102, 104-05 (4th Cir 2000) (denying jurisdiction
to hear 18 USC § 925(c) petitions absent a final determination on the merits and denial of
relief by the Secretary).
4 See Mullis v United States, 230 F3d 215 (6th Cir 2000); McHugh v Rubin, 220 F3d
53 (2d Cir 2000); Saccacio v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 211 F3d 102 (4th
Cir 2000); Owen v Magaw, 122 F3d 1350 (10th Cir 1997); Burtch v United States Department of the Treasury, 120 F3d 1087 (9th Cir 1997).
) See Bean v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 253 F3d 234 (5th Cir 2001);
Rice, 68 F3d 702.
6 See US Const Amend II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
7 See David T. Hardy, The FirearmsOwners' ProtectionAct: A Historicaland Legal
Perspective, 17 Cumb L Rev 585, 589-95 (1987) (describing the history of federal firearms
regulations).
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A. Early Regulations Restricting Firearms Privileges
Prior to the 1930's, the only federal provision regulating firearms in the United States was a 1927 ban on using the mail to
send firearms capable of concealment on one's person.8 Since that
time, Congress has revised and supplemented the federal firearms laws extensively.9
Beginning in the early 1930's, Congress began regulating the
use of firearms because of heightened public concern over increased criminal activity. ° In response to these concerns, Congress passed the National Firearms Act of 1934.11 The Act regulated a number of types of weapons, required firearm registration, and required firearms "dealers" to obtain licenses to ship or
receive firearms in interstate commerce. 2 The Act also made it a
had been shipped by a party who
crime to possess a firearm that
13
did not pay the necessary tax.
Congress addressed firearms regulations again in the 1930's,
passing the Federal Firearms Act in 1938.4 The 1938 Act not
only required firearms dealers and manufacturers to obtain licenses when shipping firearms in interstate commerce, but also
prohibited those convicted of a "crime of violence" from possessing
firearms shipped in interstate commerce.15 The Federal Firearms
Act marked the first time Congress restricted persons from possessing firearms due to a criminal conviction.' 6 Subsequently,
Congress changed this provision to effectively preclude any person convicted of a felony under federal law from carrying or otherwise possessing a firearm. 7

8 See id at 589-90, citing 18 USC § 1715 (1982).
9 See Ronald C. Griffin, Note, Obtaining Relief from Federal FirearmsDisabilities:
Did Congress Really Suspend the Relief Available to Felons Through AppropriationsActs?,
23 Okla City U L Rev 977, 980-81 (1998) (tracing the early development of federal firearms regulation).
10 See Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 590-91 (cited in note 7) (describing the revisions to
federal firearms laws in light of increased criminal activity in the 1930's).
11 48 Stat 1236 (1934).
12 See Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 591-95 (cited in note 7), citing HR 9066, 73d Cong,
2d Sess (1934).
13 See National Firearms Act, 48 Stat 1236 § 6 (1934).
14 52 Stat 1250 (1938).
15 See Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 598 n 71 (cited in note 7) (summarizing 52 Stat 1250
(1938).
16 See id.
17 See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-616, 82 Stat 1212 (1968).
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The "Relief From Disabilities" Program

In addition to restricting individuals, federal firearms laws
also regulated corporations."8 The Federal Firearms Act prohibited corporations convicted of felonies from possessing firearms
and did not treat them any differently from individual felons.1 9
Later, however, Congress revised aspects of the firearms laws in
a manner specifically favorable to corporations. Under a 1965
amendment to the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, felonious corporations could petition the ATF for "relief" from the "disability" of
not being able to purchase and possess firearms.2 ° This program
was instituted primarily as a favor to Winchester, a firearms
manufacturer and a division of the Olin Mathieson Corporation. 2
In 1962, the Olin Matheson Corporation was convicted of a felony
charge involving a kickback scheme to foreign governments.2 2
This conviction prohibited its subsidiary, Winchester, from possessing or otherwise engaging in the firearms trade.2 3 The firearms relief program, instituted in the 1965 amendment to the
Federal Firearms Act, allowed Winchester to remain in business.2 4 At the time, neither the Treasury Department nor the Department of Justice's report to the House Committee on Ways
and Means objected to the firearms relief program.25
Although carefully crafted, the "relief from disability" program was not expressly limited to corporations; thus, individual
felons also filed petitions under the program.2" In 1992, at the
height of the relief from disabilities program, Congress spent approximately $3.7 million annually to process, investigate, and
make a final recommendation on about one thousand § 925(c) ap18 See generally Authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to Grant Relief From Certain Provisions of the Federal Firearms Act, HR Rep No 89-708, 89th Cong, 1st Sess 2-3
(1965).
19

Id.

20

See Act of Sept 15, 1965, Pub L No 89-184, 79 Stat 788 (1965). See also Hardy, 17

Cumb L Rev at 598 (cited in note 7).
21 See HR Rep No 89-708 at 3-4 (cited in note 18) (describing the program as created
for the benefit of the Olin Mathieson Corporation).
22 United States v Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp, 368 F2d 525, 525-26 (2d Cir 1966).
23 See HR Rep No 89-708 at 2 (cited in note 18). See also Federal Firearms ActRelief From Provisions of Act, S Rep No 89-666, 89th Cong, 1st Sess 1-5 (1965), reprinted
in 1965 USCCAN 3117, 3118-19.
24 See Editorial, How Your Tax Dollars Arm Felons, NY Times A16 (July 27, 1992)
(noting that the relief from disability program allowed Olin Mathieson to remain in business).
25 See S Rep No 89-666 at 1-6 (cited in note 23) (noting both departments' agreement).
26 See Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 643 (cited in note 7).
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plications, although approximately three thousand to four thousand applications were received each year by the Secretary.2 7
Therefore, Congress spent approximately thirty-seven hundred
dollars to process each "relief from disability" application.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Firearms Owners Protection
Act ("FOPA"), which expanded the number of persons or firearms
dealers who could seek relief under 18 USC § 925(c).28 FOPA
permitted any person or dealer whose federal firearms privileges
had been revoked to petition the Secretary to provide relief from
their federal firearms disability.2 9 Additionally, FOPA instituted
the first opportunity for judicial review of petitions denied by the
Secretary of the Treasury after an investigation by the ATF °
Under this amendment, the court has discretion to review such
decisions and may add to the record if necessary to make an equitable determination."
Suspension of Appropriations

C.

Starting in 1993, however, Congress began to withhold all
funding from the ATF to process § 925(c) petitions, purportedly
eliminating the Secretary of the Treasury's ability to review these
applications. 2 This restriction on funding has continued through
the date of publication of this Comment. 3 Although Congress did

See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1993: Hearings on HR 5488 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations, 102d Cong, 1st Sess 69, 71-72 (1993) (statement of Mr. Higgins).
28 See Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub L No 99-308, 100 Stat 449 (1986).
29 See id; 18 USC §§ 921-30 (2000).
30 See Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 100 Stat 449 (1986); 18 USC § 925(c) ("The
27

court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in
a miscarriage of justice.").
31 See Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 100 Stat 449 (1986).
32 See Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub L No 102-393, 106 Stat
1729, 1732 (1992) ("[N]one of the funds appropriated herein shall be available to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 USC
925(c).").
33 See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub L No 107-67,
115 Stat 514 (2001) (generally denying funds to process § 925(c) petitions, but permitting
the use of funds for investigations of corporate petitions); Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub L No 106-554, 114 Stat 2763, 2763A-129 (2000);
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub L No
106-58, 113 Stat 430, 434 (1999); Treasury, Postal Service, and General Governmental
Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub L No 105-277, 112 Stat 2681, 2681-485 (1998); Treasury
and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub L No 105-61, 111 Stat 1272, 1277
(1997); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat
3009, 3009-319 (1996); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub L No 104-52,
109 Stat 468, 471 (1995); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub L No 103-
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not repeal § 925(c) from the United States Code,34 this denial of
funding has made it practically impossible for the ATF and the
Secretary to take any action on § 925(c) applications. 5 One of the
primary motivations for this withdrawal of funding was the belief

of some members of Congress that too much money was being
spent to rearm felons. 6 Some congressmen stated that the funds
could be better used on law enforcement activities.3 7
The last notable piece of legislative activity involving § 925(c)
occurred in 1995. Republicans on the House Appropriations
Committee attempted to pass a provision that would have renewed an individual felon's ability to apply for relief from their
federal firearms disabilities." The provision would have allowed
felons to pay a fee to have the ATF review their application.3 9 The
provision passed out of committee, but the Appropriations Committee removed it less than two weeks later.4 ° Although there
does not appear to be any discussion of the issue on the House
floor, the media, including the Washington Post, noted that the
proposal "ran into heavy criticism from law enforcement groups
and gun-control activists," which resulted in its prompt removal
from further consideration.4 '
Independent of the funding issue, § 925(c) allows those prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law to petition
the Secretary to remove an applicant's firearms disability.4 2 The
329, 108 Stat 2382, 2385 (1994); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub L
No 103-123, 107 Stat 1226, 1228-29 (1993).
34 A number of attempts have been made to repeal § 925(c), but none of these attempts have been reported out of committee. See note 128.
35 See, for example, Rice v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,68 F3d 702, 709
(3d Cir 1995) (noting that due to lack of funds, ATF would not undertake an investigation).
36 Statements on Bills and Joint Resolutions, 103d Cong, 1st Sess, in 139 Cong Rec S
10847 (Aug 6, 1993) (statement of Senator Lautenberg) ("It is hard to imagine a more
outrageous waste of hard-earned taxpayer dollars."); 142 Cong Rec S 12164 (Oct 2, 1996)
(statement of Senator Simon) (opposing judicial review as a waste of taxpayer money).
37 139 Cong Rec S at 10849 (cited in note 36) (statement of Senator Lautenberg) (noting Treasury Secretary Bentsen's agreement that § 925(c) review is not the best use of
resources); 142 Cong Rec S 12164 (Oct 2, 1996) (cited in note 36) (statement of Senator
Simon).
38 Stephan Barr, GOP Backs Off Proposal On Firearms for Felons, Wash Post A04
(July 12, 1995).
39 Id.
40
41

Id.
Id.

42 A copy of the petition for relief from disability is available on the ATF web site. See
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Application for Restorationof Firearmsand/or
Explosives Privileges, available online at <www.atf.treas.gov/forms/pdfs/f32101.pdf> (visited Nov 18, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
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Secretary may grant such relief if the applicant "will not be likely
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and... granting of
the relief would not be contrary to the public interest."43 However,
when the Secretary denies relief from firearms disabilities, the
applicant may petition the United States District Court for the
district in which he resides for review of such denial, and the
court may use its discretion to admit additional evidence "where
failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice."" These
provisions are the subject of substantial judicial disagreement.
II. CONFLICTING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF § 925(c)
Courts have not come to a uniform decision regarding the
proper interpretation of § 925(c) in light of the funding restrictions placed in the federal appropriations acts. The majority of
circuits have held that the courts may not exercise jurisdiction
over § 925 petitions,4 5 while a minority of courts take the opposite
view.46
A. The Majority View: Denying Review
Following Congress's denial of funds for § 925(c) petitions,
the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to expressly deny
§ 925(c) petitions on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.47 In Burtch v
United States Department of the Treasury,4" the Ninth Circuit
held that § 925(c) was clear on its face, and that the language of
the statute as well as the relevant appropriations acts provided a
clear message from Congress suspending petitions under

43 18 USC
44 See id.

§ 925(c).

45 See Mullis v United States, 230 F3d 215 (6th Cir 2000); McHugh v Rubin, 220 F3d
53 (2d Cir 2000); Saccacio v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 211 F3d 102 (4th
Cir 2000); Owen v Magaw, 122 F3d 1350 (10th Cir 1997); Burtch v United States Department of the Treasury, 120 F3d 1087 (9th Cir 1997).
46 See Bean v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 253 F3d 234 (5th Cir 2001);
Rice v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,68 F3d 702 (3d Cir 1995).
47 The Fifth Circuit denied review of a § 925(c) petition when it decided United States
v McGill, 74 F3d 64 (5th Cir 1996), but did not affirm the lower court's decision, which had
denied the petition, based on lack of jurisdiction. The McGill court held that the language
used by Congress in its appropriations acts expressed a clear intention to suspend relief,
but the court apparently abandoned this position with its recent decision in Bean v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 253 F3d 234 (5th Cir 2001), rehearing en banc
denied, 2001 US App Lexis 20565, *1 (5th Cir). Bean held that Congress's "suspension" of
funds, due to the passage of time, has resulted in a complete preclusion of relief for petitioners before the ATF; therefore, jurisdiction exists to review § 925(c) petitions.
48 120 F3d 1087 (9th Cir 1997).
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§ 925(c).49 The Burtch court felt that the clarity of the statutory
text precluded any analysis of the legislative history.5"
The Tenth Circuit followed this line of reasoning in Owen v
Magaw,5 ' holding that because the Secretary of the Treasury had
not expressly denied an application, the courts could not review
the matter until the ATF had issued a final determination and
denial.52 The Owen court also stated that the ATF was the best
agency to investigate and deal with the fact-finding required by
Congress, and that the courts were ill-suited for that task.5
The Fourth Circuit entered the fray with its decision in Saccacio v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.4 The court,
interpreting the word "denial" to mean "an adverse determination
on the merits" rather than "a refusal to act," held that the statute
effectively denied the courts the ability to exercise jurisdiction
when the ATF simply refused to act on § 925(c) petitions. The
court acknowledged that the petitioner in the matter, Saccacio,
may not have "been afforded the ultimate relief for which he applied"; nevertheless, because he had not received a denial from
the Secretary of the Treasury under the definition the court established, it lacked jurisdiction. 6
The Second Circuit in McHugh v Rubin 7 held that Congress's
intent through its appropriations statutes was "clear and manifest" and that the Congress "could not have stated more clearly
that the ATF is prohibited from acting on applications submitted
by individuals pursuant to § 925(c)." 8 The Second Circuit based
its decision on the plain language of the statute, but also noted in
its reasoning that the legislative history of the statute confirmed
its reading. 9 The court also held that the inability of the ATF and
the Secretary of the Treasury to act did not constitute an effective

49 Id at 1090 (holding that "the failure to appropriate investigatory funds should be
interpreted as a suspension of that part of § 925(c)").
60 See id ("Because the statute is clear on its face, we conclude, unlike the Fifth Circuit, that we should not examine legislative history.").
51 122 F3d 1350 (10th Cir 1997).
52 Id at 1354.
53 Id ("The BATF has the requisite manpower and expertise for making this
determination, while the courts do not.").
54 211 F3d 102 (4th Cir 2000).
55 Id at 104, citing Burtch, 120 F3d at 1090.
56 Saccacio, 211 F3d at 104.
57 220 F3d 53 (2d Cir 2000).
58 See id at 58.
59 Id at 58 n 2 ("[T]he legislative history, which we need not consult in light of the
plain meaning of the appropriations statutes, does confirm [denying jurisdiction].").
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denial of the petitions for review. 6' Further, the McHugh court
determined that to have jurisdiction over a § 925(c) appeal, the
Secretary must have acted on the petition in question prior to
judicial review, specifically by undertaking an investigation
through the ATF.6 1 Finally, the court acknowledged that the district courts were no more empowered under the statute to review
applications than the ATF, and that the statute grants courts the
authority merely to add to the record of evidence, not to create an
evidentiary record from scratch.2
The latest court to deny jurisdiction is the Sixth Circuit. In
Mullis v United States,6 3 the court reversed the district court and
held that the court did not have jurisdiction to review § 925(c)
firearms relief petitions.6 4 The Mullis court held that the legislative history and appropriations provisions provided a clear message of congressional intent, and that any court action would be
impractical and ill-suited to the functions of the judiciary. In
addition, the Mullis court considered its responsibilities under
the Administrative Procedures Act, which requires courts to set
aside agency decisions only when they are unreasonably delayed
or otherwise unlawful.66 The court felt that the decision of the
ATF not to undertake an investigation due to the restrictions on
funding were not "unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed"
and therefore did not warrant judicial interference.6 7
B.

The Minority View: Allowing Jurisdiction

The Third Circuit was the first federal appellate court to address whether courts have jurisdiction under § 925(c) when Congress withholds funds, and it was the first appellate court to affirm jurisdiction. In Rice v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms," the court held that district courts may exercise jurisdiction over the ATF's "refusal" of § 925(c) petitions. 9 The Third Circuit did not view the ATF appropriations restrictions as manifesting a clear intent to repeal § 925(c), and it therefore refused to
60 Id

at 60-61.

61

McHugh, 220 F3d at 59-60.

62

See id.

63
6

230 F3d 215 (6th Cir 2000).

Id at 221.

See id at 219-20.
See id at 219, discussing 5 USC § 706 (1994).
67 Mullis, 230 F3d at 219.
68 68 F3d 702 (3d Cir 1995).
69 Id at 707 (noting that none of the appropriations bills "expressly preclude a court
from reviewing [ATFI's refusal to process an application for relief").
65
66
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strike down the statute on a theory of implied repeal. ' ° While the
court acknowledged that the restrictions essentially prohibited
the ATF from processing applications for relief, it believed that
the language was not clear enough to effectuate repeal of the
statute or to otherwise preclude judicial review.71
Next, the Rice court discussed whether a decision of the Secretary constituted a "denial" under the text of the statute, and
whether Rice had exhausted his administrative remedies. The
court acknowledged that a person is entitled to administrative
relief only when the proscribed administrative remedy is exhausted. 2 Citing extensively from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in McCarthy v Madigan,73 the court noted that it
must balance the interests of the individual in retaining a prompt
judicial hearing with the interests favoring exhaustion.74 The
Court also drew from the Supreme Court's decision in Coit Independence Joint Venture v Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corp,75 which held that the lack of a reasonable timeframe for
administrative hearings rendered exhaustion inadequate, in
which circumstance, judicial review could commence."
Consistent with Rice, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that so long as Congress has not repealed the statute providing judicial review, where the only congressional action is a denial of appropriations to the ATF, courts could exercise jurisdiction to review § 925(c) petitions.77 The court essentially relied
upon controlling authority in Rice and held that the mere revoca7'
tion of appropriations could not effectuate the denial of relief.

According to the court, the denial of government funding constituted a miscarriage of justice sufficient to warrant judicial review.79
The development of the law in the Fifth Circuit is more turbulent. After Congress withheld the ATF's funding to review
70

Id.

71

See id (holding that "Congress has not repealed the statute or restricted judicial

review to deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over Rice's challenge").
72 See Rice, 68 F3d at 708, quoting McKart v United States, 395 US 185, 193 (1969).
73 503 US 140 (1992).
74 Rice, 68 F3d at 708, quoting McCarthy, 503 US at 144-45 (1992).
75 489 US 561, 579 (1992).
76 Rice, 68 F3d at 708-09, citing Coit Independence Joint Venture, 489 US at 579
(1989).
77 See Palma v United States, 48 F Supp 2d 481, 485 (E D Pa 1999) ("Congress has not
changed the law providing legal authority to grant relief in appropriate cases, and § 925(c)
remains on the books."), overruled on other grounds, 228 F3d 323 (3rd Cir 2000).
78 Palma, 48 F Supp 2d at 485-86.
79 See id at 486.
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§ 925(c) petitions, the Fifth Circuit was the first to deny federal
judicial review of the petitions."° In United States v McGill,"1 the
court held that the language Congress used to restrict appropriations from being spent on § 925(c) petitions precluded judicial
review. 2 The McGill court held that Congress could suspend or
repeal federal laws through an amendment to an appropriations
bill, as long as the intent of Congress to abrogate was clear. 3
While not directly affirming the district court's decision on
the basis of lack of jurisdiction, the McGill court specifically held
that Congress, in the relevant appropriations acts, barred funding for petitions filed under § 925(c), and that this clear denial
mooted the jurisdictional question decided by the lower court.8 4
Additionally, the court noted that while Congress had prohibited
all petitions from being reviewed in 1993, it modified this restriction in 1994 to allow review of corporate petitions while maintaining the restrictions on review of those petitions submitted by
individuals.8 5 The court found that these legislative acts
strengthened the view that Congress wanted to maintain a ban
on investigations of petitions filed by individuals. 6
In 2000, Judge Joe Fisher of the Eastern District of Texas87
effectively dismissed McGill in Bean v Bureau of Alcohol, To80 The Third Circuit first addressed this issue in Rice, 68 F3d 702, but held that
courts have jurisdiction.
81 74 F3d 64 (5th Cir 1996).
82 See id at 67 (concluding that Congress intended to preclude relief, not to shift the
burden to the courts).
83 Id at 66 ("Thus, the question of whether the appropriations bill suspended the relief
available under § 925(c) turns on the intent of Congress.").
84 See id at 66-67 ("Although we doubt that the district court has original jurisdiction
...

we pretermit that question because ... Congress suspended the relief provided by

§ 925(c).").
85 See McGill, 74 F3d at 67-68.
86 Id. See also Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1995, 108 Stat at 2385:
Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated herein shall be
available to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal
firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c): Provided further, That such
funds shall be available to investigate and act upon applications filed by
corporations for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C.
925(c).
But see 1993 Treasury Appropriations Act, 106 Stat at 1732 ("Provided further, That none
of the funds appropriated herein shall be available to investigate or act upon applications
for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c).").
87 Judge Fisher served for forty years on the federal bench after being appointed by a
reluctant President Eisenhower in 1959. He was reported to be a very fair and principled
jurist, but his tenure was not without controversy. Judge Fisher was named one of the
best trial judges in the nation and displayed his principle both on and off the bench. In
1979, he ignored a presidential order requiring air-conditioning systems in federal build-
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88 Bean inadvertently left two hundred
bacco, and Firearms.
rounds of ammunition in plain view in his automobile while traveling across the Mexico-U.S. border to attend a gun show as a
dealer.89 He was convicted of firearms violations under Mexican
law and sentenced to a term of five years in a Mexican prison but
was transferred to the United States to serve out the remainder
of his sentence, in accordance with an international treaty.9"
Bean's conviction resulted in the automatic revocation of his firearms privileges under 18 USC § 922(g)(1). 9
After "diligently" searching the legislative history, Judge
Fisher interpreted the Fifth Circuit's holding in McGill as requiring that Congress clearly suspend relief in order for jurisdiction
to fail.9 2 Therefore, the district court undertook what it considered
an extensive review of the legislative record to find "clear" language and determined that congressional intent was not as clear
as the Fifth Circuit believed.93 Essentially, the court found that
McGill gave improper weight to a Senate Report dealing with
Treasury Appropriations while giving no weight to a Subcommittee Report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations.94 The
Senate report stressed the need to correct and avoid injustices
through the use of petitions for relief, while the House report
noted the need to spend resources previously allocated to reviewing these petitions on preventing violent crime.95

ings to run at no lower than eighty degrees, ordering his set at no higher than seventyfour. He clashed with the media on access to his courtroom during certain testimony and
also with civil rights activists fighting for broader desegregation orders. He also presided
over the landmark case allowing workers a cause of action against asbestos manufacturers
for their injuries, which was upheld by the Fifth Circuit. Judge Fisher died just four
months after deciding Bean at the tender age of ninety. The preceeding detail is taken
from Kevin Carmody, Judge Opened Door For Injured Workers, Austin AmericanStatesman Al (June 20, 2000).
88 89 F Supp 2d 828 (E D Tex 2000).
89 Id at 829.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See Bean, 89 F Supp 2d at 832 ("[Tlhe [McGill] court concluded that relief from
federal firearms disabilities under Section 925(c) had been 'clearly' suspended by the Appropriations Acts.").
93 See id ("This Court has concluded that in looking at the legislative history as a
whole, it does not reach the level of 'clarity' needed to suspend the type of relief which is
expressly provided for in the statute.").
94 Id at 833-34 (noting that "[t]he transcript of a Senate subcommittee hearing provides insight as to the true reason for the funding cuts").
95 See id at 832-33.
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Judge Fisher noted that the inclusion of some kind of judicial
review was important.96 Thus, while Congress expressed its intent that the ATF not undertake review of § 925(c) petitions, the
courts were under no such restriction.97 The court held that the
judicial branch was well-suited to determine a petitioner's ability
to possess a firearm, even in the absence of an initial review and
a "conclusive" decision from the ATF.9" Finally, the court held
that the exhaustion doctrine would not apply because Congress
"gave the district courts discretion to create or supplement the
administrative record when necessary to avoid a miscarriage of
justice."99
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld jurisdiction and allowed
for relief, overturning McGill. 0 The court noted that a 1992 Senate bill introduced to eliminate the § 925(c) relief program had
never made it out of committee. 1 The Court attributed great significance to this failed attempt by Congress to revoke § 925(c),
implicitly noting that Congress's failure to revoke the statute, or
rather its declination to act, was indicative of its intent to keep
§ 925(c) on the books. 10 2 Additionally, "the effective nontemporary 'suspension' of statutorily created rights" due to the
annual denial of funding persuaded the court that the inability of
the Secretary to make a decision constituted a de facto exhaustion of administrative remedies for which the court could exercise
jurisdiction.'

Bean, 89 F Supp 2d at 833 ("Adding judicial review to the existing legislation was
intended to afford individuals not inclined to engage in criminal activity the 'essential'
opportunity to demonstrate trustworthy character.").
97 See id at 835 (holding that Congress did not intend to suspend all relief, but rather
to suspend ATF investigations).
98 Id at 836.
9 Id at 837.
100 Bean v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,253 F3d 234, 239 (5th Cir 2001).
The Fifth Circuit appears to have misread its own decision in McGill. While the Bean
court claimed McGill held that "federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear appeals from
individuals," Bean, 253 F3d at 237 n 4, the McGill panel expressly stated that while "we
doubt that the district court has original jurisdiction to consider an application to remove
the Federal firearm disability, we pretermit that question because it is clear to us that
Congress suspended the relief provided by § 925(c)." McGill, 74 F3d at 65-66 (1996) (emphasis added).
101 See Bean, 253 F3d at 237-38. See also Stop Arming Felons (SAFE) Act, S 2304,
102d Cong, 2d Sess, in 138 Cong Rec S 2675 (March 3, 1992).
102 See Bean, 253 F3d at 238-39.
96

103

Id at 239.

564

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2001:

III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Courts disagree over how to interpret Congress's appropriations acts based on the wording of § 925(c). The threshold questions to answer are whether and under what circumstances the
text of the statute allows the courts to exercise jurisdiction over
§ 925(c) petitions, and whether the legislative history and the
appropriations acts suspend all review of individual's § 925(c)
petitions. The doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies will be discussed in the next section.
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit are satisfied
that § 925(c) is clear on its face and that no further historical
analysis is needed." 4 The other federal appellate courts engage in
some degree of probing into the historical record to determine
Congress's intent. Such review has not, however, produced uniform results. Those circuits that have analyzed the legislative
record are split over its proper interpretation." 5
A.

The Plain Meaning of § 925(c)

The Ninth and Fourth Circuits are each satisfied that the
plain meaning of § 925(c), specifically the term denial, is clear,
obviating any need for further analysis of the legislative history.'
Under § 925(c), the grant of jurisdiction to the courts
stipulates that "[a]ny person whose application for relief from
disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a petition ...for a
judicial review of such denial."°7 The courts have jurisdiction
when the application is denied by the Secretary. 8 The use of the
word "deny" in its various forms is significant. The statute does
not offer a definition of what constitutes a denial. The Ninth Circuit offered its own definition, noting that it views a denial under
§ 925(c) as requiring that the Secretary make "an adverse determination on the merits" and that denial "does not include a refusal to act." 9

104 See Saccacio, 211 F3d at 104; Burtch, 120 F3d at 1090.
105 Compare Owen, 122 F3d at 1354 (reading the legislative history to support a denial
of jurisdiction) with Bean v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 253 F3d 234, 23638 (5th Cir 2001) (reading the legislative history to support jurisdiction).
'O6 See Saccacio, 211 F3d at 104 (upholding the definition of "denial" proposed by the
Ninth Circuit).
107 18 USC § 925(c) (emphasis added).

108 Id.
109 Burtch, 120 F3d at 1090.
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Such a reading of the term denial is supported in the text of
the statute. Section 925(c) indicates that the role of the court in
such a situation should be to "admit additional evidence where
failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice." 110 If the
district courts were intended, based upon the text of the statute,
to make an initial determination independent of the Secretary,
then presumably the statute would not provide for the admission
of additional evidence and the standard by which to admit that
evidence, namely the avoidance of a miscarriage of justice."'
One could argue that the court could admit additional evidence even when there is no body of evidence to start with. This
technically could be viewed as adding to an initially empty body
of evidence. This view can be accepted only if one views this
clause in a vacuum, independent of the statutory scheme allowing for review by the Secretary. The entire paragraph constituting § 925(c) cannot be parsed and viewed independently of the
other provisions and must be read as a unified whole.1" Toward
this end, the plain language of § 925(c) does not support a grant
ofjurisdiction to the courts.
B.

Original Intent and Legislative History of § 925(c)

While the plain language of § 925(c) can be read to support a
denial of jurisdiction, an analysis of the legislative history also
supports this view."' None of the courts interpreting § 925(c)
have attributed any significance to the original impetus for
§ 925(c): the desire of Congress to create an exception under
which the nation's largest firearms manufacturer could apply for
relief."4 The exception was created for the Olin Mathieson Corporation and its firearms subsidiary Winchester, but it incidentally
allowed individual felons to petition for relief as well." 5 So strong
was the desire to protect Olin Matheson that the court specifi110 18 USC § 925(c) (emphasis added).
111 See 18 USC § 925(c) (2000).
112 See, for example, Market Co v Hoffman, 101 US 112 (1879) ("[Elvery part of a statute must be construed in connection with the whole, so as to make all the parts harmonize, if possible, and give meaning to each.").
113 See Owen, 122 F3d at 1354 n 1 (noting that even where the legislative history is
clear, it is prudent for the courts to examine the relevant legislative history).
114 See HR Rep No 89-708 at 2-3 (cited in note 18).
115 Id at 5 (proposing that the statute read "A person who has been convicted of a crime
punishable for a term exceeding one year ... may make application to the Secretary of the
Treasury for relief ... ") (emphasis added). Use of the term "person," rather than a narrower term such as "corporation" mirrored the original firearms statute and is the term
currently used at 18 USC § 925(c).
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cally stayed entering its sentence against Olin Mathieson so that
Winchester had an opportunity to request that Congress change
the law, which Congress did.116
While this original intent is not dispositive of the issue, it
informs analysis of Congress's subsequent actions. In 1986
through FOPA, Congress expanded the relief from disabilities
program to include individuals who had felony firearms convictions-individuals who under the previous scheme could not apply.117 In 1992, however, Congress eliminated all funding for ATF
review of § 925(c) petitions beginning with the 1993 fiscal year,
yet one year later Congress allowed funding exclusively for review of corporate petitions, not for individuals.1 8 By taking these
actions, Congress essentially reverted to the original scheme designed in 1968 to protect and assist corporate felons." 9 Members
of Congress expressed their views that Congress should not be in
the business of arming individual felons. 2 ° But in allowing for
review of corporate petitions for relief under the appropriations
statute, Congress was reverting to the true intent of the original
1968 amendment, which was to allow corporate petitions for relief; however, this language and the legislative history surrounding it also restricted individual felons from seeking relief.
C.

Misgivings Regarding the Arguments of the
Pro-Jurisdiction Courts

In Rice, the Third Circuit relied primarily on the doctrine of
exhaustion in addressing the plaintiff's claim, but it nevertheless
analyzed the issue of jurisdiction. 2 ' The Rice court believed that
Congress could only suspend substantive legislation or preclude
116 See Hardy, 17 Cumb L Rev at 598 n 73 (cited in note 7) ("The court stayed judgment of conviction to give [Olin Mathieson] an opportunity to seek legislative change.");
United States v Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp, 368 F2d 525, 525-26 (2d Cir 1966) (affirming the decision of the lower court).
117 See Griffin, Note, 23 Okla City U L Rev at 981 (1998) (cited in note 9) ("FOPA expanded the categories of who is eligible for relief. Congress accomplished this by amending
the relief provision so that any person prohibited from possessing firearms may now seek
relief.") (citations omitted).
118 Compare 1994 Treasury Appropriations Act, 107 Stat at 1228-29 (allowing funds to
investigate corporate petitions, while prohibiting funds for other § 925(c) investigations),
with 1993 Treasury Appropriations Act, 106 Stat at 1732 (prohibiting the use of funds for
ATF § 925(c) investigations without exception for corporations).
119 HR Rep No 89-708 at 2-3 (cited in note 18) (noting congressional attention to the
Olin Mathieson problem).
120 See Statements on Bills and Joint Resolutions, 103d Cong, 1st Sess, in 139 Cong
Rec S 10847 (cited in note 36) (statement of Senator Frank Lautenberg).
121 Rice, 68 F3d at 706-07.
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judicial review of administrative action through appropriations
statutes where it makes its intention to do so abundantly clear.122
The Fifth Circuit similarly held that abrogation through appropriations are disfavored, that Congress's continual suspension of
funds effectively constituted a denial of administrative remedies,
and that Congress had the opportunity to repeal § 925(c) in 1992
and failed to do so. 123 Judge Fisher, in the district court proceedings of Bean, placed particular emphasis on the role of traditional
statutory interpretation in making his finding of jurisdiction.1 24
However, Judge Fisher failed to consider the totality of the
legislative history, ignoring the original intent of the statute, the
congressional decision to allow expenditures for review of corporate petitions while prohibiting spending for individual petitions,
and the failed 1995 amendment addressing alternative funding
for the program.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit based its decision on "congressional action/inaction and its continuing effect," primarily noting
the failed 1992 legislation that would eliminate § 925(c), legislation that was introduced before Congress's actual suspension of
125
funds, and Congress's failure to actually invalidate § 925(c).
However, the Supreme Court has noted that congressional silence
is a poor guidepost for determining congressional intent. 126 To the
contrary, while Congress has not expressly repealed § 925(c), it
has acted clearly every year since 1993 through its appropriations statutes to preclude review of individual petitions for relief.127 Further, the Fifth Circuit ignores the failed 1995 attempt
in the House of Representatives to remove the appropriations
restriction. Such congressional action must also be considered in
12
fleshing out the complete legislative history of § 925(c). 1
122

Id at 707.

123

See Bean v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,253 F3d 234, 236-38 (5th Cir

2001).
Bean, 89 F Supp 2d at 832-34.
Bean, 253 F3d at 237-38.
126 See Zuber v Allen, 396 US 168, 184 (1969) ("Legislative silence is a poor beacon to
follow in discerning the-proper statutory route.").
124
125

127

See note 33.

It should be noted that members of Congress have introduced legislation since 1992
to repeal § 925(c). See Leave No Child Behind Act of 2001, HR 1990, 107th Cong, 1st Sess,
in 147 Cong Rec H 2710 (May 24, 2001); Stop Arming Felons (SAFE) Act, HR 2281, 106th
Cong, 1st Sess (June 18, 1999); Stop Arming Felons (SAFE) Act, HR 1228, 105th Cong, 1st
Sess, in 143 Cong Rec H 1297 (Apr 8, 1997); Stop Arming Felons (SAFE) Act, S 1068,
104th Cong, 1st Sess, in 141 Cong Rec S 10569-71 (July 24, 1995); Stop Arming Felons
(SAFE) Act, S 1400, 103d Cong, 1st Sess, in 139 Cong Rec S 10847 (Aug 6, 1993); Stop
Arming Felons (SAFE) Act, S 2304, 102d Cong, 2d Sess, in 138 Cong Rec S 2675 (Mar 3,
1992). This legislative history and failure to report each of these bills out of committee
128
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Alternatively, however, the Fifth Circuit may be motivated
by the original intent of the § 925(c): to allow for commercial
dealers of firearms to obtain relief from Federal firearms disabilities. While not providing relief to a corporate petitioner, the court
seemed swayed that Bean, "a licensed firearms dealer," had been
arrested while "participating in a gun show."129 The court appeared to grant jurisdiction at least in part because it viewed the
exception created for the Olin Mathieson Corporation as analogous to the needs of Bean.13 ° To the extent that the Fifth Circuit
created an exception for corporate felons, its decision may not be
inconsistent with the original intent of § 925(c), but the decision
still appears to misinterpret the legislative history, the exhaustion doctrine, and the decisions of the other courts of appeals.
The Rice court similarly indicated that Congress should have
repealed § 925(c) instead of attempting to abrogate it through
appropriations acts.' 3 ' The Supreme Court has held that "[tihe
meaning to be ascribed to an Act of Congress can only be derived
from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction,"
including the appropriations acts.'32 By reading the text in a vacuum, the Rice court is tossing aside valuable clues and insight as
to what goals Congress was trying to achieve through its legislative history and abrogation through appropriations.
D.

Suspension of Relief, Not Suspension of ATF Relief Nor
Modification of the Statute

In a defense of the claim that courts have jurisdiction, Ronald
Griffin argues that Congress actually intended to modify the text
of § 925(c) through its appropriations acts.133 Griffin based this
argument on the belief that Congress viewed the ATF's budget as
must be weighed against Congress's actual denial of funds through its appropriations
statutes, and is therefore not, by itself, sufficient to support the grant of jurisdiction by the
courts.
129 Bean, 253 F3d at 236.
130 See id at 237 n 9:
In the case at bar we are presented with a situation thht is virtually indistinguishable from that used granting relief to [the Olin Mathieson
Corporation], i.e., absent the ability to possess and sell firearms Bean
will lose his business. Bean is his 'corporation' and the inequities of the
situation are readily apparent."
131 See Rice, 68 F3d at 707.
132 United States v Dickerson, 310 US 554, 562 (1940).
133 See Griffin, Note, 23 Okla City U L Rev at 998 (cited in note 9) ("Rather than suspension of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through lack of funding to the BATF, this Note submits Congress modified 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through the suspension of funding to the BATF.").
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wasteful and wanted to help those individuals who "hunt and collect guns in a lawful manner."'34 Further, he contends that "Congress knew the judiciary was acting upon relief applications and
wanted the BATF to handle corporate applications and the judiciary to handle applications from individuals."3 ' Griffin claims
that the legislative history demonstrates Congress's historical
desire to provide relief to non-violent felons;'36 unfortunately,
Griffin presents no evidence of congressional sensitivity to the
needs of non-violent felons when it passed the funding restrictions in its 1993 appropriations acts, or when the House appropriations committee upheld the status quo funding scheme. 37 To
the contrary,
the record indicates no such sensitivity or leni8
ency. 13

IV. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

Even if courts hold that that they have jurisdiction over
§ 925(c) petitions, they still may not satisfy the requirements of
the exhaustion doctrine. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is one among
related doctrines-including abstention, finality, and ripenessthat govern the timing of federal-court decisionmaking."1 39 Essen-

tially, the doctrine of administrative remedies states that where
there is an administrative remedy available, an individual must
exhaust that remedy before turning to the courts. 4 ° The Third
Circuit relies primarily on this theory.'
A. Background
The leading cases regarding the exhaustion of administrative
remedies are Darby v Cisneros"" and McCarthy v Madigan.'
See id.
Id at 1001.
See id at 1002.
137 See Griffin, Note, 23 Okla City U L Rev at 998-1000 (cited in note 9).
138 See note 185 and accompanying text.
139 McCarthy, 503 US 140, 144 (1992). See also Darby v Cisneros, 509 US 137, 144-45
(1993) (describing the judicial doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as distinct from finality).
140 See McCarthy, 503 US at 144-45 ("This Court long has acknowledged the general
rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from
the federal courts.").
141 See Rice, 68 F3d at 707-08 (evaluating the exhaustion doctrine in its grant of jurisdiction).
142 509 US 137 (1993).
143 503 US 140 (1992).
134
135
136
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Darby and Madigan both establish the grounds upon which the
courts may impose an exhaustion requirement.' The McCarthy
Court stated that the exhaustion doctrine is required because it
"serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency
authority and promoting judicial efficiency."'45 The exhaustion
doctrine applies with special force when "the action under review
involves exercise of the agency's discretionary power or when the
agency proceedings in question allow the agency to apply its special expertise." 46
The McCarthy Court outlined three sets of circumstances in
which courts may initiate legal proceedings before administrative
action has been exhausted. First, courts will not require exhaustion where strict adherence to administrative action will result in
undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of the action in question.147 Second, courts will not require administrative action
where there is doubt regarding the agency's ability to make its
determination and provide relief.4 s Finally, a court may view the
administrative action as inadequate if the body is biased or has
otherwise predetermined the issue in question. 149 But where Congress has "meaningfully addressed" the appropriateness
of re150
quiring exhaustion, that intent is persuasive.
Refusal of § 925 Petitions Does Not Meet the Exhaustion
Doctrine Criteria Defined in McCarthy

B.

The ATF's refusal or inability to complete an investigation is
not a circumstance that satisfies the McCarthy exceptions. First,
there would not be any prejudice regarding the subsequent exercise of a right. The Supreme Court has established that the right
to possess a firearm after a disabling conviction is not a right, but
a privilege.' 5 ' Congress is under no more of an obligation to provide a speedy review of an individual's § 925(c) petition than it is
to create the scheme by which such petitions are reviewed in the
144 Id. See also Darby, 509 US 137 (the Darby court made its decision in part on the
basis of the Administrative Procedures Act, which is not directly at issue in this analysis).
145

503 US at 145.

146

Id, citing McKart v United States, 395 US 185, 194 (1969).

147 Id at 146-47.
148 Id at 147, quoting Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564, 575 n 14 (1973).
149 See McCarthy, 503 US at 148, citing Gibson, 411 US at 575 n 14.

150 McCarthy, 503 US at 149.
151 Lewis v United States, 445 US 55, 66 (1980) ("This Court had recognized repeatedly
that a legislature constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities far more fundamental than the possession of a firearm.").
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first place.152 Consequently, the courts are under no obligation to
expediently review denials of this privilege.
Next, McCarthy holds that the exhaustion doctrine will not
be applied if there is some doubt that the agency is authorized to
provide relief.153 As examples, the Court notes that an agency
may not be properly authorized to make a decision where it lacks
institutional competence, where the procedure is inadequate, or
where the agency may be competent but lacks the authority to
enact the relief needed."' Only the last of these provisions could
be used to support jurisdiction over § 925(c) petitions, but the authority noted by the Court to support this prong involved a claim
that would have been utterly futile in light of a binding state supreme court decision which effectively removed from the agency
the power to grant relief.155 Denial of funds does not fall within
the allowable categories under this second exception.
The final McCarthy exception also does not apply, because
the "predetermination" contemplated by the Court involves bias
or other unfairness in the adjudication of the claim by the administrative agency.' 56 There are no claims that the ATF's investigative or review procedures or its officers are biased in their decision making; to the contrary, the ATF cannot be biased where, for
financial reasons, it is prohibited from undertaking any investigation regardless of the petitioner.
C.

Congressional Intent Does Not Favor Exhaustion

The language of the statute allows the courts to review decisions of the Secretary when the Secretary denies a petitioner relief.'57 The statute provides that "[any person whose application
for relief from disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a
petition with the United States district court for the district in
which he resides for a judicial review of such denial." 5 ' At issue is
what constitutes a "denial" by the Secretary, and whether this
exhausts the administrative remedies available.
152

See id (noting that Congress does not have to create an exception to the firearms

laws).
153 McCarthy, 503 US at 147.
154 See id at 147-48.
155 See Montana NationalBank v Yellowstone County of Montana, 276 US 499, 503-05

(1928).
156 McCarthy, 503 US at 148 (exhaustion is not required where a decision has been
predetermined based on discrimination, harassment, or other like considerations).
157 18 USC § 925(c).
158 Id.
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A pivotal factor in considering the exhaustion doctrine is
congressional intent."9 As the McCarthy Court noted, "even in
this field of judicial discretion, appropriate deference to Congress's power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under
which a claim may be heard in a federal court requires fashioning
of exhaustion principles in a manner consistent with congressional intent and any applicable statutory scheme."16 ° However,
"where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs."16'

Section 925(c) grants authority to review petitions for relief
from disability to the ATF.'62 It establishes the criteria to be used
by the Secretary, and it states that the courts may review a denial of a petition.' The statute also stipulates that the court may
admit "additional evidence where failure to do so would result in
a miscarriage of justice."'64 This language permits reviewing
courts to supplement the record, not create a new record. Additionally, the appropriations statutes do not provide any more information that could be construed as a grant of authority to the
courts in the absence of an ATF denial. Senator Paul Simon indicated as much in 1996 when he reaffirmed that "the goal of
[§ 925(c)] has always been to prohibit convicted felons from getting their guns back-whether through the ATF or the courts. It
165
was never our intention to shift the burden to the courts."
166
sentiments.
Simon's
Senator
Other congressmen echoed
D. The Statute Grants Permissive, Not Mandatory,
Action by the ATF
If Congress restored funding to the ATF budget for review of
individuals' § 925(c) petitions, under the text of the statute there
would be nothing prohibiting the Secretary of the Treasury from
resuming the normal process of review. Under this scenario, if
159 See Patsy v Board of Regents of the State of Florida,457 US 496, 501 (1982) (noting
that legislative purposes are of "paramount" importance in the exhaustion context).
160 McCarthy, 503 US at 144, citing Patsy, 454 US at 501-02.
161 McCarthy, 503 US at 144.
162 18 USC § 925(c).
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 142 Cong Rec S 12164 (statement of Senator Simon) (cited in note 36).
166 See Jefferson Robbins, Durbin Wants to Restrict Gun Ownership by Felons Waiting
Period, Background Checks Proposed, State J-Register 9 (July 23, 1995). See also Steny H.
Hoyer, Hoyer to Oppose 'Guns for Felons' Provision in Treasury, Postal Bill, Federal
Documents Clearing House, Congressional Press Releases (July 10, 1995) (expressing
opposition to legislation which would permit felons to apply for relief)
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the Secretary chose to deny a petition, the courts could exercise
jurisdiction over a felon's appeal. 11 7 However, nothing in the statute requires the Secretary, under any circumstances, to act on
§ 925(c) petitions. The statute merely states that individuals
"may" petition the Secretary for relief, and the Secretary "may"
grant such relief if certain conditions are met.'6 8 Congress could
have easily stated that the Secretary "shall" grant relief if the
Secretary judges that the applicant meets certain criteria. The
permissive nature of the language allows for agency discretion.
The Act anticipated that the ATF would undertake an investigation and that the Secretary "may" choose to grant relief.
Congress did not intend to force § 925(c) decisions through
the Treasury Department or the courts. 6 9 The original House report makes this clear, noting that the committee reporting the
bill "in no way intends to determine whether Olin, or others to
whom this bill will be applicable, should be allowed to manufacture and sell firearms" but that it would be "desirable to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief" in appropriate
cases. 7 ° These considerations render the exhaustion doctrine inadequate to support jurisdiction or reinstatement of firearms
privileges for felons.
V. PRUDENTIAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to the statutory interpretation and textual construction methods of analyzing the statute, as well as the exhaustion issues, there are a number of prudential and policy arguments that cut against the exercise of jurisdiction over § 925(c)
petitions absent a denial from the Secretary.
A.

Financial Considerations Are Not a Factor

Supporters of granting jurisdiction in § 925(c) cases argue
that Congress denied funds to the ATF because of budget concerns with that department, but did not prevent other resources
from being expended in reviewing the petitions. 7 ' At least one
court and one commentator have argued that Congress's denial of
167

See 18 USC § 925(c).

168

Id.

169 See HR Rep 89-708 at 3 (cited in note 18) (recognizing that the Secretary should be
allowed, but not compelled, to grant relieft
170 Id.
171 See, for example, Griffin, Note, 23 Okla City U L Rev at 998 (cited in note 9) (arguing that Congress withdrew ATF funding but not judicial relief)
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funding does not preclude other agencies, specifically the courts,
from expending resources on § 925(c) petitions.' 2
In Bean, the Eastern District of Texas ruled that courts could
assert jurisdiction because Congress did not revoke the ability of
petitioners to seek review of their claims-but Congress only
shifted the burden of paying for this process from the ATF to the
courts."' Under this theory, in order for the parties to bring evidence and be heard before a court, they must themselves investigate and bring forward statements and other materials for the
bench to review.' 74 Furthermore, Griffin has also argued that
Congress only eliminated funding for administrative action, leaving the courts untouched as an alternative avenue of funding.' 5
This argument, however, fails to acknowledge that the
courts, in hearing and ruling on § 925(c) petitions, will still expend resources. Notably, there is no evidence that the courts are
necessarily fiscally more efficient than the Treasury. Instead,
courts are generally considered less efficient at the type of factfinding required in § 925(c) petitions. 76 Further, even if the
courts were fiscally more efficient than the ATF, saving money is
not the primary purpose of the statute, for Congress expressed its
desire to eliminate the possibility for individual felons to reacquire their firearms through personal subsidizing of costs or
shifting the funding burden to the courts.'77 Even proponents of
jurisdiction acknowledge that the legislative record is clear that
Congress believes that the ATF has special skills and that courts

172 See Bean, 89 F Supp 2d at 836 (noting that the cost burden would be shifted to the
applicant in judicial proceedings); Griffin, Note, 23 Okla City U L Rev at 998 (1998) (cited
in note 9).
173 Bean, 89 F Supp 2d at 836.

174 See id.
175 Griffin, 23 Okla City U L Rev at 998 (cited in note 9) ("Congressional concern ap-

peared to be with the BATF's inefficient and wasteful administrative review process
rather than a desire to curb the availability of relief itself.").
176 See Owen, 122 F3d at 1354 ("The BATF has the requisite manpower and expertise
for making this determination, while the courts do not."); Mullis, 230 F3d at 220:
These institutional disadvantages make it highly unlikely that Congress
intended district court[s] to review an applicants [sic] dangerousness to
society in the first instance. Nor would the costs to the courts in making
an investigation be less than the costs to the ATF. They might well be
greater since there would be no investigation or testimony by trained
agents for the court to rely on.
177 See S Rep No 89-666 at 1-5 (cited in note 23) (noting the original intent of the relief
from disabilities program).
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are less well-suited to undertake the kind
of investigation and
178
fact finding mandated under the statute.

The effective defeat of the 1995 amendment, which would
have allowed felons to pay a fee to have the ATF review their
cases, provides additional support for Congress's implicit desire
that felons' firearms privileges not be reinstated for any reason,
9
even if individual applicants pay for investigations themselves.1
Although the full Congress did not raise the issue, the Appropriations Committee recommended removing the funding restriction
from the statute, but reversed itself in the face of public criticism.18 This reversal is additional evidence that important
considerations, in addition to fiscal responsibility, motivated Congress when it addressed this issue. 8 '
B. Courts Should Not Aggressively Try to Rearm Felons
Rewriting rules and making exceptions so that individuals
with a firearms disability can have such a disability removed is
not a popular position. 2 The Supreme Court has established that
the ability to possess a firearm after a disabling conviction is not
a right but a privilege.' 83 Thus, Congress is acting within its
power4 when it revokes firearms privileges from convicted fel8
ons.

Congressional testimony demonstrates Congress's desire to
keep firearms away from felons. For instance, after the Rice court
made its decision, then-Senator Paul Simon, one of the original
sponsors of the ban on funding before Congress, was highly critical, saying that:
This misguided decision could flood the courts with felons
seeking the restoration of their gun rights, effectively
shifting from ATF to the courts the burden of considering
these applications ....

Given this conflict in the circuit

courts, it is important that we again clarify our original
178

See Griffin, Note, 23 Okla City U L Rev at 996 (cited in note 9).

179 See Stephen Barr, GOP Backs Off Proposal On FirearmsFor Felons, Wash Post

A04 (July 12, 1995) (detailing the defeat of the proposal allowing for felons to pay for their
§ 925(c) investigations).
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 See, for example, Lewis v United States, 445 US 55, 66 (1980) (noting congressional
concern about firearms possession by felons).
183 See id (finding that Congress may prohibit felons from possessing firearms).
184 Id ("[A] legislature constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in
activities far more fundamental than the possession of a firearm.").
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and sustaining intention. The goal of this provision has
always been to prohibit convicted felons from getting their
guns back-whether through ATF or the courts. It was
never our intention to shift the burden to the courts. 85
Giving guns to felons is not a politically popular position, and it
draws an emotional response from many, including the Violence
Policy Center ("VPC"), a public interest organization, which describes the "relief from disabilities" program as a "second chance
club" supported by the National Rifle Association. 8 ' The VPC
says that of one hundred felons who had been granted relief by
the Secretary, five had convictions for sexual assault, eleven had
burglarized, thirteen had been convicted of narcotics charges, and
four had committed homicide. 87 These kinds of statistics do not
make for good public relations, and provide strong policy argu188
ments against allowing government sanctioned "relief."
CONCLUSION

This Comment has shown that Congress has expanded its
regulation of firearms over the last century. An extensive analysis of the legislative history provides a valuable tool to understand the current debate over § 925(c). A thorough reading of the
legislative record on the subject of federal firearms regulations,
when considered in its entirety, provides a clear picture of the
proper reading of § 925(c) in light of the appropriations acts that
deny funding for this provision. The legislative history demonstrates congressional desire to allow § 925(c) relief petitions to be
filed by corporate petitioners only and not by individual felons.
Even if courts read the relevant history as an endorsement of
jurisdiction by Congress, they must respect the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Congress established a
scheme that anticipates a full review and determination on the
merits by the ATF before any judicial review takes place. Congress did not suspend funding for individual relief petitions only
to provide applicants with a means to circumvent the ATF.
185 142 Cong Rec S 12164 (statement of Senator Simon) (cited in note 36).
186 See Violence Policy Center, Guns for Felons: How the NRA Works to Rearm Criminals, available online at <http://www.vpc.org/studies/felons.htm> (visited January 22,
2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
187 See id.
188 See Bean v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,253 F3d 234, 236-38 (5th Cir
2001), 253 F3d 234, 237 (5th Cir 2001) (noting that the views of the Violence Policy Center
contributed to the restriction of funds by Congress).
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Rather, Congress intended to suspend application of the statute
for individuals while leaving its provisions intact for review of
corporate petitions-thus reverting to the original intent of the
statute as introduced in the 1960's.
Finally, other policy considerations weigh heavily in this debate. Congress and many courts have expressed serious reservations over granting felons, who have in many cases committed
heinous crimes, the right to once again possess a firearm, regardless of whether the felons themselves pay for the necessary applications. Barring further action by Congress or the Courts, however, felons under the jurisdiction of the Third and Fifth Circuits
may have their firearms petitions reviewed by the courts, while
other felons may not. This disparity should be resolved in favor of
waiting for congressional authorization-even if it never comes.
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